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GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT USER-FRIENDLY MASS 
MARKET LICENSING FOR SOFTWARE 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Software publishers use standard form end user licenses (“EULAs”) in 
mass market transactions on a regular basis. Most software users find EU-
LAs perplexing and generally ignore them.1 Scholars, however, have fo-
cused on them intently. In the past twenty years over a hundred scholarly 
articles have been written on the subject.2 Most of these articles criticize 
EULAs and argue that courts should not enforce them. 
In their critique of EULAs, some scholars examine the adequacy of 
the offer, acceptance, and consideration.3 Others discuss EULAs as part of 
                                                                                                                          
 * Director, Intellectual Property Law & Policy Program and Associate Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Washington School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues Steve Calandrillo, Sean 
O’Connor, and Kate O’Neill for helpful comments, and especially Jane Winn for her insights on Legal 
XML. Thanks also to Keith Aoki, Vince Chiapetta, Maggie Chon, Lydia Loren, Joe Miller, and Greg 
Silverman for helpful comments on an early draft that I presented at the Pacific Intellectual Property 
Scholars Conference. I am grateful to James Allan, Sarah Hollingsworth, Jim Jantos, Jolene Marshall, 
Divya Verma, and Mary Whisner for research assistance, as well as the Shidler Center for Law, Com-
merce & Technology for research funding. 
 1 Scott J. Burnham, How to Read a Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 133, 133 (2002) (“Whether the 
document is found on the computer screen or the printed page, the reader would prefer to click or sign, 
taking a chance on the terms of surrender, rather than read it.”). 
 2 A search of the term “shrink wrap license” on Westlaw returns a list of 116 law review articles 
written between 1984 and 2004. See also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief 
Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 336 
(1996) (listing 15 articles published between the years 1985 and 1995) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz & 
Williamson, Brief Defense of Mass Market License Agreements]. In 1996, the Seventh Circuit decided 
the seminal case on mass market licenses, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). The 
ProCD decision stimulated many additional articles, as did the process to create the model licensing 
statute known as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (formerly known as U.C.C. 
Article 2B). See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise 
of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 891 (1998) [hereinafter 
Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product]; Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy 
of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 113 (1999); Apik Minassian, The Death of Copy-
right: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569 (1997); J. Thomas 
Warlick, IV, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Information Licensing and De Facto Copyright Legislation in 
UCC 2B, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 158 (1997). 
 3 See, e.g., Jeff C. Dodd, Time and Assent in the Formation of Information Contracts: The Mis-
chief of Applying Article 2 to Information Contracts, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 195 (1999); David A. Einhorn, 
Box-Top Licenses and the Battle-of-the-Forms, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 401 (1992); Richard H. Stern, Shrink-
  
688 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 12:3 
the troublesome issue of standard form contracting, and whether standard 
forms, on balance, harm or benefit consumers.4 Still others focus on the 
intellectual property-contract law interplay.5 These issues are important to 
be sure, but there is little left to say. The issues have been talked to death. 
Despite all the scholarly debate, one important reality remains: EU-
LAs are here to stay for the foreseeable future.6 Courts, by and large, have 
enforced EULAs, provided the software publisher gives the user a reason-
able opportunity to review and the user makes a meaningful manifestation 
of assent.7 Given this reality,8 it is crucial to address an issue that scholars 
have thus far ignored: what can be done to make licensing more “user-
friendly?”9 Specifically, what can be done to help people better understand 
                                                                                                                          
 
Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 51 (1985); Michael Ryan, Note, Offers Users Can’t Refuse: Shrink-
Wrap License Agreements as Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105 (1989). 
 4 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002).  
 5 See, e.g., Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Phi-
losophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1318-21, 1345-46 (2003) (criticizing the use of mass 
market licenses for data and information but praising their use for open source software); Dennis J. 
Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); 
Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1025 (1998); Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual 
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption 
After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997). 
 6 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 4. 
 7 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 302 F. 3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Specht v. Netscape 
Communications, Corp., 306 F. 3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (approving some mass market license transactions 
and not others); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (mixed computer hardware 
and software consumer transaction); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1447; Storm Impact v. Software of the 
Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (court assumes enforceability of mass market license); Arizona 
Retail Sys., Inc., v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding a mass market li-
cense enforceable in the initial transaction between a value added reseller and a software publisher, but 
unenforceable in a subsequent transaction; Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998) (mixed 
computer hardware and software transaction); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 
P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000). But see Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(refusing to enforce EULA in transaction between distributor and value-added reseller); Vault Corp. v. 
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 8 See Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 292 (1995) (reporting that two-thirds of software company lawyers believe shrink 
wrap licenses should be enforceable). 
 9 I use the word “friendly” and the term “user-friendly” to mean that a license communicates 
information effectively and presents fair terms to the user. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
“friendly” as: “disposed or likely to be helpful,” “not jarring or conflicting,” “in computing, easy and 
convenient to use . . . designed with the needs of users in mind.” 
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the terms and conditions of EULAs, and what can be done to encourage 
software publishers to craft simpler, fairer, more understandable licenses?  
Part I of the article summarizes the heated debate about the use of 
mass market licenses in software transactions. Part II describes the typical 
contract-drafting process that leads to the creation of an unfriendly EULA. 
Part III argues that although software users and publishers share an interest 
in user-friendly licenses, serious obstacles get in the way. Parts IV through 
X then explore a series of ways to overcome these obstacles. 
First, the article explores the ways that lawyers and the software pub-
lishers that they work for can craft more readable EULAs. Second, it ad-
dresses the positive role that law school education could play in training 
lawyers to craft more user-friendly EULAs. Third, it describes how tech-
nology such as “shopbots” and XML can make EULAs more user-friendly 
by helping software purchasers find EULAs with the terms they want. 
Fourth, it comments on the advisability of applying “plain language” legis-
lation to EULAs as a way of inducing software publishers to improve EU-
LAs.  
The article concludes that the most powerful way to improve the user-
friendliness of licensing is through new public interest non-government 
organizations (“EULA NGOs”) which use the mass communications capa-
bilities of the World Wide Web.10 Using the Web, a EULA NGO could 
provide objective, expert, easy-to-read commentary on the pros and cons of 
particular EULAs to assist users in their purchasing decisions. A EULA 
NGO could also provide constructive feedback to software publishers about 
how to improve their licenses and describe and promote licensing best prac-
tices.  
Moreover, a EULA NGO’s commentary would create a valuable re-
cord of public comment about individual EULAs. This record could be 
used by a court in the event a user challenges or a software publisher at-
tempts to uphold the enforceability of a EULA. The very existence and 
easy availability of this public record will provide a strong incentive for 
software publishers to improve the friendliness of their licensing.  
I. A WHIRLWIND TOUR OF THE EULA DEBATE 
Software publishers began using EULAs during the personal computer 
revolution. Software licensing existed prior to that time, but software was 
not a mass market product and the use of standard form contracts was un-
necessary.11 The transition to EULAs was unremarkable.12 Standard form 
                                                                                                                          
 10 The organization would be akin to a Consumers Union for EULAs.  
 11 See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, Brief Defense of Mass Market License Agreements, supra 
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contracts are common;13 indeed, modern commerce could not function ef-
fectively without them.14 
Software publishers use EULAs for a variety of important reasons. 
First, EULAs allow them to license various packages of rights to users at 
various price points.15 For example, a software publisher might license 
word processing software to business users for one price, to home users for 
a lower price, academic institutions for an even lower price,16 and to chari-
table organizations for free.17 Certain types of software, such as server soft-
ware and developer tools, must be licensed to be useful—a Copyright Act 
“first sale” does not provide sufficient rights.18 Software publishers use 
licensing to foster innovative software developments such as “open source” 
software.19 Open source EULAs grant broad rights to make and distribute 
derivative works.20 
                                                                                                                          
 
note 2, at 338-41; Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 
291 (2003). 
 12  There are, to be sure, some important differences between mass market software licenses and 
standard form contracting in other industries, but those differences often favor end users. See 
Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 2, at 898; Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 757 (2002). 
 13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981); E.A. FARNSWORTH, FARNS-
WORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2d ed. 1990). 
 14 See Todd A. Radkoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1174, 1218-25 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1971) (standard form contracts “probably account for 
more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made”). 
 15 See Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 2, at 896. 
 16 See Adobe Sys. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 17 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. 
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO A NETWORK ECONOMY, 19-83 (1999). 
 18 Software tools usually come with sample code, libraries, and other code that a programmer uses 
as a starting point to write a software program. The programmer needs a license from the software tool 
publisher to create derivative works and to distribute the derivative works and the redistributable code 
included in the toolkit. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, Brief Defense of Mass Market License 
Agreements, supra note 2, at 363-64. Use of server software often entails making multiple copies of the 
server software, client software, and various other administrative software that comes with the package. 
See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 19 See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the 
Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179 (1999) 
[hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights]; David A. McGowan, Legal Implica-
tions of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241 (2001); Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes 
of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 24 (2000); Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus 
or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349 (2002); Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative 
Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 11 (2000).  
 20 See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, The GNU General Public License, § 6 (June 1991), avail-
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EULAs also serve the practical purpose of explaining to users what 
can and cannot be done with the software.21 Even unfriendly EULAs do this 
to a degree, but most EULAs do far less than they should or could, which is 
the impetus for this article.  
Although software publishers see the value of EULAs, scholars object 
to them for many reasons.22 Their arguments may be summarized as fol-
lows: the contract formation process is flawed;23 the “take it or leave it” 
nature of the process is unfair;24 the “pay first, terms come later” sequence 
of events is flawed and unfair; it is too easy to hide terms; the method of 
contracting improperly extends intellectual property protection;25 this use of 
contracts is preempted either by the Copyright Act or the United States 
Constitution.26  
Courts, by and large, have enforced EULAs, unless the software pub-
lisher failed to give the potential user a reasonable opportunity to review 
the license27 or the user did not make a meaningful manifestation of as-
sent.28 Judicial construction of EULAs has gone about the same way as 
                                                                                                                          
 
able at http://www.fsf.org/licenses/licenses.html#TOCGPL; UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BSD License, 
available at http://www.opensource.org (license grant section). See generally Gomulkiewicz, How 
Copyleft Uses License Rights, supra note 19, at 185-94 (explaining the importance of licensing to open 
source software). 
 21 See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, Brief Defense of Mass Market License Agreements, supra 
note 2, at 346-52. 
 22 Many hoped that the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act would resolve the objec-
tions, but this did not happen. See Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 643 (2003). 
 23 See generally David A. Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses and the Battle-of-the-Forms, 5 SOFTWARE 
L.J. 401 (1992); Richard H. Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable 
Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51 (1985); Michael G. 
Ryan, Note, Offers Users Can’t Refuse: Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as Enforceable Adhesion 
Contracts, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105 (1989). 
 24 E.g., Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agree-
ment as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319 (1999). 
 25 E.g., J. Thomas Warlick, IV, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Information Licensing and De Facto 
Copyright Legislation, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 158 (1997). 
 26 E.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial 
Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570 (1995); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the 
Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 
DUKE L.J. 479 (1995). 
 27 See Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998); 1-A Equip. Co. v. I- 
Code, Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 807 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000). 
 28 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) began the trend, followed soon by Hill 
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (The Hill case, however, is about computer hard-
ware, not software). Other cases followed. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs. Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 
(Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 938 (2003); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 
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other standard form contract cases: terms are construed against the drafter,29 
unconscionable terms are not enforced,30 specifically negotiated terms win 
out over terms in the form,31 and the user is not excused merely because he 
or she chose not to read the contract.32 This leads to the inevitable conclu-
sion that, despite the large volume of scholarly criticism, EULAs are here 
to stay for the foreseeable future. 
II. CREATING EULAS IN THE REAL WORLD33  
Businesspeople in the software publishing industry understand the 
value that mass market licensing provides, but typically they view the li-
cense-creating process as a task in which they play a peripheral role.34 They 
believe that creating a EULA is the lawyer’s domain. At most, their role is 
                                                                                                                          
 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (approving some mass market license transactions and not others); Adobe Sys., 
Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002); I.Lan Sys. v. Netscout Serv. 
Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 
13 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998) (court assumes enforceability of mass market license); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software 
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding a mass market license enforceable in the initial 
transaction between a value added reseller and a software publisher, but unenforceable in a subsequent 
transaction); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000); Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (mixed computer hardware and software 
transaction).  
 29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, at § 
4.24. In the context of intellectual property licenses, compare S.O.S, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 
(9th Cir. 1989) with Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995); Uniform Computer Infor-
mation Transactions Act § 307(f) (1999) [hereinafter U.C.I.T.A.]. 
 30 Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 211; U.C.C. § 2-302 (2001). 
 31 See Morgan Lab., Inc., v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1850 (N.D. Cal. 1997); 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 209(a)(1) (1999). 
 32 See Groff v. America Online, Inc., No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 
1998). 
 33 The accounts in this section are based on the composite of my experience working as inside and 
outside counsel for large, medium, and small software publishers. I spent ten years as a licensing lawyer 
at Microsoft and five years at Preston, Gates & Ellis in Seattle, Washington. I also chaired the 
U.C.I.T.A. Working Group of the Business Software Alliance during the U.C.I.T.A. drafting process 
(BSA members include Adobe, Apple, Autodesk, and Novell). 
 34 The “hackers” of the open source community may be an exception to this general rule. Hacker 
notables often discuss licensing. See Brian Behlendorf, Open Source as a Business Strategy, in OPEN 
SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 149, 164-69 (1st ed. 1999); Jim Hamerly & 
Tom Paquin, Freeing the Source: The Story of Mozzilla, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN 
SOURCE REVOLUTION 197, 200-03 (1st ed. 1999); Bruce Perens, The Open Source Definition, in OPEN 
SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 171 (1st ed. 1999). 
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to review a draft and sign off on the final document. As the release date for 
a software product approaches, they busy themselves with final prepara-
tions for the product launch: fixing bugs,35 honing the marketing message, 
and signing up strategic partners. 
The businessperson most interested in the EULA is often someone in 
the operations group. That person is not concerned with the EULA’s con-
tent, only its form and finality. He or she has two persistent questions: “Is it 
done? Will it fit in the allotted space?” 
The lawyers, especially in-house counsel, have many issues pressing 
on them as the product launch date nears. They might be clearing a last 
minute trademark conflict or settling a patent dispute. They might be re-
viewing advertising materials, drafting and negotiating strategic alliance 
contracts, and maybe even signing up a celebrity spokesperson. The EULA 
is one of many emergency projects that the lawyer faces and in the tyranny 
of the urgent, it often falls far down the “to do” list.36  
Under pressure to get the EULA drafted quickly at the last minute,37 
the lawyer uses a pre-existing EULA as a starting point, making the mini-
mum necessary changes. The more the lawyer lingers over the revisions, 
the shriller the businesspeople get—”is it done yet?” they demand. “How 
could a short document full of boilerplate take so long to draft?” they won-
der.  
Under these real world circumstances, the EULA stands little chance 
of being eloquent, stylish, or even particularly readable.38 No one system-
atically re-thinks the business-deal points that are reflected in the words of 
the EULA, especially the boilerplate at the end of the document. Some say 
that that is just fine with software publishers, maybe even their goal—that 
they are intent on obfuscation not clarity. However, in my experience, 
                                                                                                                          
 35 See CEM KANER & DAVID L. PELS, BAD SOFTWARE: WHAT TO DO WHEN SOFTWARE FAILS 
(1998); G. PASCAL ZACHARY, SHOW-STOPPER!: THE BREAKNECK RACE TO CREATE WINDOWS NT AND 
THE NEXT GENERATION AT MICROSOFT (1994) (describing the bugs encountered in the last minute rush 
to ship Windows NT); Eric S. Raymond, How to Become a Hacker, at 
http://www.zvon.org/ZvonHTML/Translations/hacker/chapter5_en.html (“In this imperfect world, we 
will inevitably spend most of our software development time in the debugging phase.”). 
 36 Normally, no senior vice president is asking “Where’s the EULA?” The V.P. only wants to 
know “Have we signed the deal with IBM yet?!” 
 37 “When creativity is under the gun, it usually ends up getting killed. Although time pressure may 
drive people to work more and get more done, and may even make them feel more creative, it actually 
causes them, in general, to think less creatively.” Teresa M. Amabile et al., Creativity Under the Gun, 
HARV. BUS. REV. 52-54, 57 (Aug. 2002). 
 38 See Peter Wayner, FREE FOR ALL 94 (Harper Business 2000) (reporting that an important open 
source license, the BSD-style license, was essentially a last minute “cut and paste” job from a Univer-
sity of Toronto license).  
  
694 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 12:3 
software businesspeople and their legal counsel seldom cynically connive 
to create an impenetrable EULA. It just happens naturally.39 
End-users, of course, only see the net result—a wordy license, written 
in legalese, crammed onto a small piece of paper40 or displayed electroni-
cally41 with little thought given to its presentation. A curious user may read 
a bit of it. He or she may quickly skim the document for onerous terms. On 
rare occasions the user will ask a lawyer to help interpret the license. Usu-
ally, however, the user does not read the license at all.  
III.  SHARED INTEREST IN USER-FRIENDLY LICENSES 
A. Users 
Software users could certainly benefit from more readable licenses. 
Well-informed consumers make better purchasing decisions, a principle 
that is fundamental to consumer protection law and policy.42 In the case of 
software, the user not only acquires a collection of product features but also 
a set of license rights. In most software transactions the license is the prod-
                                                                                                                          
 39 It is fair to say that both commercial and non-commercial licensors have difficulty creating 
user-friendly licenses. The leading “open source” licenses are not easy to understand. See Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licensing]. Another good illustration is the form 
licenses provided by the Creative Commons project. The Creative Commons is a public interest organi-
zation whose mission is to encourage artists to dedicate their works to the public domain or to license 
them freely. The Creative Commons licenses are written in legalese. However, in an attempt to be user-
friendly, Creative Commons has adopted various graphical symbols to signify certain grants of rights. 
Each Creative Commons license also comes with a summary of the license but the summary makes it 
clear that it is not legally binding—it calls the legalese the “legal code.” Though well-intentioned, 
innovative, and useful, these techniques reinforce the notion that licenses are for lawyers, not the aver-
age users, and that licenses with legalese are inevitable. 
 40 Software companies are not the only ones trying to fit a lot of information into a small space—
the “legalese” at the end of radio advertisements for loans or autos is read in rapid fire fashion, which is 
barely discernable. 
 41 The fact that the EULA is in electronic form is not enough to defeat its enforceability. See In re 
Real-Networks, Inc. Privacy Litigation, No. 00-C1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000). 
 42 Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Market for Consumer Product Evaluations: An Anlaysis and a Pro-
posal, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1237-39 (1985). See also Hans Rask Jensen, Consumer Education as a 
Parameter of Consumer Action in Latin America and the Caribbean, 14 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 207 
(1991) (consumer education is important in most industrialized countries and some of the more ad-
vanced developing countries). Whether consumers actually take advantage of this information or use it 
to the best of their advantage is the subject of debate. See id. 
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uct—the software is capable of doing many things but the license describes 
what the user is entitled do.43 
Software publishers sometimes compete on the scope of license rights 
granted, and it benefits consumers to understand the different packages of 
rights being offered.44 Two examples provide good illustrations. In the 
early 1980s, WordPerfect for DOS was the best selling word processor for 
PCs. Microsoft hoped that it could top WordPerfect with a graphical user 
interface-based word processor for the Windows platform. Part of Micro-
soft’s strategy was to compete on license terms: it expanded its license 
grant for Word to allow business users to put a copy of Word on their home 
or laptop computer, as well as on their desktop computer at work.45 
Microsoft also used license terms to compete against Novell Netware, 
which was the dominant personal computer networking software product in 
the 1980s. Novell’s licensing required a high upfront payment for the client 
computers which would be using the services of Netware server software.46 
Microsoft’s licensing for Windows NT Server, by contrast, allowed users to 
add client licenses on an “as needed” basis, resulting in lower up-front costs 
and more flexible purchasing decisions.47  
Apart from the license rights granted in a EULA, software companies 
sometimes compete on other contractual terms, such as warranties and 
product support.48 For example, while some software companies offer no 
warranties, others promise that their products will work as described in the 
product documentation. Publishers of tax preparation software often prom-
ise to pay any penalties levied by the IRS due to software errors.49 
B. Software Publishers 
Better written EULAs have clear benefits for software users, but why 
should software publishers care? There are many reasons why they should. 
                                                                                                                          
 43 See Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 2, at 896. 
 44 Id. at 909-930 (appendix of representative license grants). 
 45 See Carol Hildebrand, Rigid Licensing Draws WordPerfect Users’ Ire, COMPUTERWORLD, 
Aug. 5, 1991, at 29 (describing WordPerfect’s licensing policy). 
 46 Paul Krill, Wifinet, Utility Reduces Netware License Requirements, INFOWORLD, March 13, 
1995, at 47. 
 47 See David P. Chernicoff, NT Client Licensing: Flexibility and Gotchas, PC WEEK, May 15, 
1995, at N18. 
 48 See Paul Andrews, Some Support for Those That Offer Support, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, 
at E1. 
 49 See EULA for TurboTax. 
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First, software publishers should want users to understand the parame-
ters of the license. The publisher cannot, realistically, expect a user to com-
ply with its grant of rights if the user does not understand the grant.50 
Second, if the publisher is offering a warranty, then it has every reason 
to get that information in front of the customer. If it is not offering one, it is 
better for the customer to know this up front rather than to have scores of 
surprised, angry customers calling on the phone or sending flame mail. 
Early candor usually sits better with customers than belated surprise. 
Third, well-crafted licenses build goodwill with customers. Publishers 
set a certain tone in their licenses.51 The tone of EULAs run the gamut—
sloppy or out of date-sounding EULAs communicate that the publisher 
does not take the license seriously; lengthy EULAs make the user suspi-
cious that the publisher is hiding things in the fine print; relatively short, 
readable EULAs in a friendly tone using contemporary language make the 
user feel as if the EULA “matters.” A license can make a user feel as if he 
or she is dealing directly with the corporate legal department (a negative 
experience) or a businessperson who values their business (a more positive 
experience). 
Fourth, the more accessible the EULA, the more willing a court will 
be to enforce it in case of a dispute. Developing goodwill with the customer 
also results in goodwill with the court. This makes sense, of course. In 
cases where the contract document is a standard form, the court wants to 
make sure the recipient of the adhesion contract was dealt with fairly. 
IV.  USER-FRIENDLY LICENSES 
This section describes the features of a user-friendly license.52 Then, it 
discusses the challenges involved in creating one. 
                                                                                                                          
 50 In the mass market, licenses are usually “enforced” by the good will of the end user, not by 
litigation. The cost of enforcing contracts in a court of law with multiple individuals would be prohibi-
tive in most cases. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 43 (2003). 
 51 The tone of the GNU General Public License, a leading open source license, attracts some 
software developers and repulses others. See Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licens-
ing, supra note 39. Microsoft’s research division attempted to attract developers to its “Virtual Worlds” 
platform with a friendly license which would appeal to academics and hobbyists. 
 52 See generally DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); RUDOLF FLESCH, 
HOW TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH: A BOOK FOR LAWYERS AND CONSUMERS (1979); DAVID MELLINKOFF, 
LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE (1982). 
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A. Features 
A user-friendly license should have the following attributes: 
 
* Be written in plain, simple language; 
* Be presented in a “friendly” format; 
* Be as brief as possible; 
* Explain concepts clearly and in sufficient detail; 
* Contain a simple licensing model; 
* Contain terms that benefit the user. 
B. Plain, Simple Language 
EULAs would be more friendly if their authors used plain, simple lan-
guage.53 Lawyers write most EULAs using a technical legal writing style. 
This style has some advantages.54 It is precise. It uses nomenclature that is 
meaningful to lawyers and judges who might interpret the license. How-
ever, this style of writing is not very accessible to the average software 
user. In fact, it communicates to the user that the audience for the EULA is 
lawyers, not average users.55  
C. “Friendly” Format 
EULAs would be more accessible if they were presented in a user-
friendly format.56 Unfortunately, many EULAs come on a small paper card, 
on product packaging, or in a user manual. The EULA is printed in black 
and white using 10-point type or less. There is very little white space in and 
around the EULA, making the text very dense. Many EULAs today are 
presented in electronic form. These EULAs tend to look a lot like the paper 
version (or worse). 
The unfriendly format of the EULA strongly suggests that the format 
was not chosen with readability in mind. Indeed, economy tends to be the 
driving force. Short documents keep the cost of goods sold low: a one page 
                                                                                                                          
 53 See generally FLESCH, supra note 52. 
 54 See generally ALFRED PHILLIPS, LAWYERS’ LANGUAGE: HOW AND WHY LEGAL LANGUAGE IS 
DIFFERENT (2003). 
 55 See generally Scott J. Burnham, How to Read a Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 133 (2002). 
 56  “E-consumers who try to read electronic boilerplate must struggle to understand pages of legal-
ese filled with jargon that would be difficult for an experienced attorney to decipher. Exacerbating the 
problem, reading from a computer screen is harder on the eyes than reading a paper form, and few users 
are likely to take time to print an electronic contract.” Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 478. 
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EULA costs less to produce than a multi-page document, black and white 
copy costs less than color.  
D. Brevity 
Users seldom read long contract documents of any kind, and EULAs 
are no exception. If EULAs were shorter, then it is more likely that users 
would read them. There is another advantage to short EULAs: brevity tends 
to encourage authors to economize on language which, in turn, often leads 
to clearer writing.57 
E. Clear Explanations 
EULAs often relate to complicated technology or business arrange-
ments. In this context, the bare words of the license, no matter how well 
written, can fail to communicate the message effectively. Illustrations, ex-
amples, and elaborations in the EULA can shed crucial light on these com-
plicated subjects.  
F. Simple License Model 
It is easier to explain a simple licensing model than a complex one. 
The more nuanced the license grant or the more conditions the software 
publisher places on use of the software, the more complex the license be-
comes.  
G. Customer-Friendly Terms 
The software publisher’s choice of substantive contract terms affects 
the EULA’s complexity. For example, it takes fewer words to give all im-
plied warranties than to disclaim them;58 to assume full liability for dam-
                                                                                                                          
 57 See MELLINKOFF, supra note 52 (arguing for precision and brevity). 
 58 It is not clear whether implied warranties apply to software licenses. Implied warranties, though 
drawn from common law concepts, come from Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2. Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in Software Contracts: A Warranty No One 
Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 393 (1997) [herein-
after Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in Software Contracts]. Some courts 
apply Article 2 to software transactions but some do not, and commentators take both sides of the issue. 
See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Lorin Brennan, Why Article 
2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459 (2000); Robert B. Mitchell, Software 
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ages than to limit liability; to remain silent on choice of law or venue than 
to choose it; to permit reverse engineering59 than to prohibit it;60 to allow 
publication of benchmark results than to ban publication; to allow free 
transfer of software than to limit it.  
V.  CHALLENGES  
User-friendly licenses should be easy to create. What stands in the 
way? This section discusses some of the challenges.  
A. License Models Getting More Complex 
The licensing model for many software products is simple: you can 
use the product in any way that it is capable of being used. For these prod-
ucts, the license grant, at most, needs to say that the user may use the soft-
ware as described in the product documentation.61 For many software prod-
ucts, however, the licensing model is more complex. Microsoft’s licensing 
model for Windows NT Server provides a good example of how a cus-
tomer-friendly licensing model can lead to EULA complexity.  
The Windows NT Server product came with client and server soft-
ware, so the EULA addressed the licenses for both. In the case of the client 
software, Microsoft allowed users to freely copy the software onto any cli-
ent computer that would, at some point, connect to the server software. In 
the case of the server software, Microsoft allowed the customer to make 
                                                                                                                          
 
and Data Transactions Under Article 2 of the U.C.C., DATALAW REP., Sept. 1995, at 14, 25-26. In the 
face of this uncertainty, most software publishers take the conservative approach and write their EULAs 
as if Article 2 applies. Consequently, most EULAs contain language either disclaiming or modifying 
Article 2’s implied warranties of “merchantability” and “fitness for a particular purpose.” In states that 
have adopted the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (Virginia and Maryland, at this 
juncture), a software transaction comes with implied warranties of merchantability of a computer pro-
gram, systems integration, and informational content, and a gap-filler warranty of non-infringement. See 
U.C.I.T.A. §§ 401-405 (1999). 
 59  Under U.S. law, reverse engineering is generally permissible unless a contract prohibits it. See 
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F. 3d 1317, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 60 See generally Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 843 (1994); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of 
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).  
 61 The right to use the software is not always as straightforward as it might be. The GNU General 
Public License clouds the issue unnecessarily. See Gomulkiewicz, Debugging Open Source Software 
Licensing, supra note 39. See also Nat’l Car Rental Sys. Ins. v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, 991 F.2d 426, 
431-32 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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copies for a relatively low per-copy fee. Microsoft also required a license, 
called a Client Access License (“CAL”), for any client software to use the 
services provided by the server software. This licensing model allowed the 
customer to get its system up and running for a relatively modest cost, and 
then pay incrementally for CALs as the customer brought additional client 
computers online. Microsoft had created a customer-friendly licensing 
model, but describing that model in a EULA was challenging.  
Several enhancements to the licensing model made things even more 
difficult for the EULA drafter. The businesspeople wanted to improve cus-
tomer choice by allowing them to purchase CALs based on a variety of 
scenarios: the number of client computers using the server services (per 
client or per seat licensing), the number of individual users using server 
services (per person licensing), or the number of client computers simulta-
neously connected62 to the server using server services (per server licens-
ing).63 To make matters more complex, the businesspeople wanted to per-
mit customers to switch around between types of CALs.64 
All of these features of the EULA were made in the interest of giving 
customers maximum choice.65 The EULA terms gave Microsoft a signifi-
cant competitive advantage vis-à-vis Novell Netware’s more expensive and 
less flexible licensing model. Yet, from the standpoint of creating a read-
able EULA, the license terms led to complexity rather than simplicity.  
B. Not Enough Participation by Non-Lawyers 
As mentioned previously, businesspeople in the software industry 
think that EULAs are in the legal department’s domain. They think that 
because a EULA is a contract document, lawyers should write it and only 
lawyers need to understand it in any detail. They often treat completion of 
the EULA as an item on a checklist for someone else to complete, with 
their only job being to create sufficient pressure on the lawyer to get the 
EULA completed on time.  
This adversely affects license user-friendliness in several ways. First, 
there is little feedback on how the EULA reads from a customer point of 
view—no lay reader questions the lawyer’s legal, technical writing style. 
Second, the licensing model is not clearly articulated because the lawyer is 
                                                                                                                          
 62 See Bert Latamore, Software Vendors Move Toward Concurrent Licensing, INFOWORLD, Nov. 
30, 1992, at 50. 
 63 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 49-50 (1999). 
 64 See David P. Chernicoff, NT Client Licensing: Flexibility and Gotchas, PC WEEK, May 15, 
1995, at N18. 
 65 See Fred M. Greguras & Sandy J. Wong, Software Licensing Flexibility Complements the 
Digital Age, 11 No. 12 COMPUTER LAW. 15, 15 (1994). 
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usually not as well-versed in the business model as the businessperson. 
Often, lack of clarity in the EULA is directly attributable to the lawyer’s 
imperfect understanding of the licensing model, which is never corrected 
by a careful business-side reader. Third, when businesspeople do not ac-
tively participate in drafting the EULA they are not forced to think through 
the hard cases and gray areas that often surface as business concepts are 
translated into a written contract.  
C. Not Enough Participation by Senior Managers 
The employee who “owns” the EULA on the business-side is usually a 
mid-level or low-level employee. Senior management sees the EULA as a 
relatively non-strategic, low revenue contract between the company and an 
individual user. However, this is an incorrect perception of the magnitude 
of the contract formed by the EULA. EULAs are, in the aggregate, a con-
tract with a group of people rivaling the largest corporate end user in size, 
bringing in revenue in the thousands or millions of dollars. Most contracts 
of this magnitude would be read and approved by senior management, but 
the EULA is not. Consequently, the high level businessperson most respon-
sible for the profitability of the software product never reviews or critiques 
the contract document that licenses it.  
Lack of leadership by a senior management can lead to another im-
pediment to improving EULAs: too much democracy. Often, multiple busi-
nesspeople have a stake in the EULA’s contents. Someone on the product 
development team may want to grant broad rights and someone on the sales 
team may want to grant narrower rights (or vice versa).  
If the product is a suite of software programs, then the product devel-
opment teams for each program may have different and conflicting notions 
of what the EULA should provide. In this situation, the EULA expands to 
accommodate the various terms proscribed by each team since no one, 
other than perhaps the lawyer, has the authority to say “no” to more words. 
It is also difficult to get consensus about terms that might be friendlier for 
users, such as warranties or limitations of liability. Since no product team 
can force another to take the “risk” of providing additional rights to the 
user, the contractual term most protective of the software publisher‘s posi-
tion usually ends up in the EULA. 
D. License Friendliness is Not a Top Priority 
Creating user-friendly licenses has seldom been viewed as a top prior-
ity of software publishers. In a corporate setting, a subordinate takes his or 
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her cues from senior management. The relatively low ranking employee 
who has been assigned the thankless task of making sure a EULA is created 
or revised will not give readability a high priority if senior management 
does not clearly signal that it is a high priority. Thus, even if senior man-
agement sincerely desires to improve EULA readability, it will never hap-
pen if management fails to get involved in the process and hold the subor-
dinate accountable for achieving a more readable EULA. If the EULA is 
not a top priority, then it will lose out to competing priorities time after 
time. In the rush to get a product out the door, it is easy for an overbur-
dened employee to go along with tried and true legalese and opt for lan-
guage that maximizes safety and revenue, even at the expense of easier to 
read prose, fewer words on the page, or more customer-friendly terms.  
E. Conflicting Objectives 
The objective of creating a more readable EULA can conflict with 
other compelling priorities. For instance, using a plain language writing 
style often means less precision and clarity in describing the licensing 
model. The increase in fuzziness can result in a decrease in revenue or in-
crease in risk since all ambiguities will be resolved against the software 
publisher who drafted the EULA.  
The aspiration to create a friendlier EULA may increase the cost of the 
product. The software publisher is trying to keep the price of its product as 
low as possible, so putting money into EULA readability creates a di-
lemma—is the increased cost worth it? Will the user, in effect, pay for the 
more readable EULA? 
The features of a more readable license may be in tension with one 
another. For example, some people suggest that brief EULAs are synony-
mous with more understandable EULAs. In some cases that is true. But the 
goal of brevity often collides with the goal of explaining concepts with il-
lustrations and elaborations. Brevity may mean that the EULA leaves gray 
areas gray. 
VI. WHAT LAWYERS (AND THEIR CLIENTS) CAN DO TO IMPROVE EULAS 
We have examined the ingredients of a user-friendly license and the 
challenges that stand in the way of creating one. This section describes 
what lawyers (and the software publishers who employ them) can do to 
improve the user-friendliness of EULAs. The scholarly debate about EU-
LAs seldom, if ever, delves into this topic. That is unfortunate and mislead-
ing, however, because the scholarly debate should not just consider what 
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legislatures or courts might do to improve EULAs. Indeed, some of the 
most viable solutions to the problems with EULAs may not come from 
legislation or judicial action at all but from private action.66  
A. Developing a Process for Creating User-Friendly EULAs 
The creation of a user-friendly license requires serious commitment on 
the part of license drafters, lawyers and businesspeople alike. Aspiring to 
create this type of EULA is a good start, but in the real world the software 
publisher and its lawyers must consciously implement a process for getting 
the job done.  
The keys to a successful process are:  
 
* Make license friendliness a top priority (not merely a priority) of 
senior management;  
* Appoint a senior manager to resolve disputed issues during the 
process and provide final review and approval;  
* Form a core group that has the expertise and decision-making au-
thority to accomplish the task; 
* Hold those who undertake the task of creating a friendly EULA ac-
countable for their results in employee reviews;67 
* Draw on expertise and perspectives outside the core group when ap-
propriate; 
* Take advantage of state of the art techniques for effective presenta-
tion of information; 
* Scrutinize every provision of the EULA. 
B. The Process in Action 
The process starts at the top: a decision by senior management that 
creating a user-friendly license is a top priority. The manager will delegate 
the drafting process to a subordinate—a EULA Product Manager (“EULA 
P.M.”). However, the senior manager does not completely step out of the 
process: he or she reviews the penultimate draft to determine whether, in 
                                                                                                                          
 66 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Col-
lective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293-1296 (1996) (arguing that private collective 
rights organizations work more efficiently than government administered compulsory licensing) [here-
inafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules]. 
 67 If the employee succeeds in the task he or she would be rewarded as appropriate. See Teresa 
Amabile, How to Kill Creativity, HARV. BUS. REV. 80 (Sept.-Oct. 1998) (describing what motivates 
employees to act creatively). 
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his or her opinion, the contract is satisfactory. The senior manager also re-
mains available along the way to help resolve disputes over business trade-
offs, such as whether to revise the EULA’s approach to warranties, or 
whether the business model should be simplified even if it means less cus-
tomer choice or leaving money on the table.68 
Although the senior manager remains available to resolve selective is-
sues when escalated by the EULA P.M., the P.M. holds significant deci-
sion-making authority. He or she is authorized to decide whether the value 
of a given EULA term is worth the complexity it adds. The P.M.’s decision 
will often come down to a choice between user-friendliness and maximiz-
ing revenue or limiting exposure to negative consequences, and the EULA 
P.M. is authorized to make the decision.  
The EULA P.M. surrounds himself or herself with a small core group: 
a lawyer, someone from the product development team, someone from the 
customer sales team, someone from the marketing team, and someone from 
the operations team. This core group represents the perspectives and exper-
tise of each stakeholder in the process.69 Each core group member under-
stands that creating a user-friendly EULA is a top priority of senior man-
agement and that he or she is accountable for achieving (or not achieving) 
that objective. Each member comes with decision-making authority on be-
half of his or her constituency. 
The EULA P.M., with input from the core group and others, identifies 
specific mileposts that will improve the EULA. For instance, the P.M. sets 
a goal of shortening the EULA by x% of words or reducing the word count 
down to x words. The P.M. decides that the EULA must fit on one piece of 
paper rather than two. The P.M. demands that the EULA be shorter than the 
EULA of a competitor. 
The P.M. chooses one of several group processes to drive the overhaul 
of the EULA. The P.M. might take the core group off site on a retreat with 
the single objective70 of simplifying the license. The group immerses itself 
in the task, working on the project until completion of a substantial re-
write. Alternatively, the P.M. could have the core team address simplifica-
tion draft by draft, meeting at regularly scheduled intervals, with specific 
simplification objectives set for each succeeding draft. Finally, the P.M. 
could work with one or two simplification experts (such a lawyer who is 
particularly adept at plain language writing) to substantially revise the 
EULA, and then take the results back to the core group which would fine 
tune the EULA to create the final version. 
                                                                                                                          
 68 See id. at 85. 
 69 See id. at 82-83 (“If you want to build teams that come up with creative ideas, you must pay 
attention to the design of such teams.”). 
 70 Teresa M. Amabile et al., Creativity Under the Gun, HARV. BUS. REV. 59 (Aug. 2002). 
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As the core group spends a significant amount of time revising the 
EULA, the members will begin to lose the perspective of the average user. 
At this point, the EULA P.M. will circulate the EULA draft to other readers 
to gauge their reactions. The P.M. might subject the EULA to formal us-
ability testing similar to the testing software companies use to evaluate the 
relative friendliness of user interface designs. The P.M. might consult 
graphic designers who can suggest improvements to the aesthetic presenta-
tion of the EULA. The designers might suggest use of color, typefaces, 
fonts, white space, and other devices to improve readability. 
If the EULA will be presented electronically, the EULA P.M. will 
consider how to use the latest multimedia features of computers to present 
the EULA in a more engaging manner. Sound, video,71 color, animation, 
rich text, and the ability to “go deeper” via HTML linking have improved 
computer usability dramatically—these techniques could have the same 
positive impact on EULAs. EULAs presented on the Internet can take ad-
vantage of the graphical capabilities of the World Wide Web and the power 
of hypertext linking. For example, key words in a EULA could link to more 
detailed explanations of EULA terms or a series of illustrations. Web for-
mat allows the EULA to be relatively brief, but puts elaborations easily 
within reach. 
VII. HOW TECHNOLOGY MIGHT ASSIST USERS  
I have already described how the multimedia capabilities of software 
can be tapped to improve the friendliness of EULAs. Other technology 
might be useful as well. Robots known as “shopbots” find products with 
defined features and prices by scouring the Web; shotbots can also act as 
the shopper’s electronic agent to purchase a product.72 For example, a 
shopbot might search the Web for sites selling six-string Taylor guitars 
with a dreadnaught shape and rosewood back for less than two thousand 
dollars.73 
In the same manner, a shopbot might search for EULAs with certain 
desirable license terms. To make this process work, a technology called 
                                                                                                                          
 71 Software publishers could take a cue from the airlines which present safety information in both 
written form and via either a live performance or a video. Even road warriors find themselves watching 
the same demonstration of seat belt buckling that they have seen many times before. 
 72 See generally Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders and Crawlers and Bots, Oh My: The Economic 
Efficiency and Public Policy of Online Contracts that Restrict Data Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, 53 (2002).  
 73 Websites known as “metasites” might also be useful. See Linda Knapp, Shopping Sites Track 
Best Prices, Merchants, SEATTLE TIMES, November 15, 2003, at C6. 
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eXtensible Markup Language (“XML”)74 would be applied to the EULA to 
make it easier for the bot to find the terms.75 XML is an information man-
agement tool that marks or tags data for easy identification and retrieval.76 
A standards organization known as “Legal XML” is considering ways to 
use XML technology with legal documents including contracts. This or-
ganization aims to define the tags that would apply to contracts. 
A simple example demonstrates how marking a EULA with XML 
could be useful. Assume that a certain XML tag identifies the warranty and 
another tag identifies the license grant. The tagging tells the bot (and the 
bot’s principal) that the EULA contains these two contract provisions. This 
information is only marginally helpful. However, if one tag signifies “no 
warranty” and another tag signifies “full warranty,” the bot could search for 
EULAs with the “full warranty” tag if that is what the user desires. Simi-
larly, if one tag signifies “free software” license77 and another tag signifies 
“BSD-style” license,78 a user could search accordingly.  
XML-reading bots hold promise79 but are years away from main-
stream usage.80 XML authoring tools are just beginning to reach the mar-
ket.81 More importantly, lawyers are only in the preliminary stages of ap-
plying XML to contracts82 and the process is complex.83  
                                                                                                                          
 74 STEVEN HOLZNER, REAL WORLD XML (2003); SIMON ST. LAURENT, XML, A PRIMER (3d ed. 
2001). 
 75 See Winchel “Todd” Vincent, III, Legal XML and Standards for the Legal Industry, 53 SMU L. 
REV. 1395 (2000); Jane K. Winn, Making XML Pay: Revising Existing Electronic Payment Law to 
Accommodate Innovation, 53 SMU L. REV. 1477, 1494 (2000) (observing that the combination of 
electronic agent software and XML has the power to improve consumer transactions). 
 76 See Douglas E. Phillips, XML Schemas and Computer Language Copyright: Filling in the 
Blanks in Blank Esperanto, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63 (2001). 
 77 See Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement, in 
OPENSOURCES 53 (Chris DiBona et al. eds. 1990); Free Software Foundation, Why “Free Software” is 
better than “Open Source,” at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
 78 See Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licensing, supra note 39 (describing 
both “free software” and BSD-style licenses); Wayner, supra note 38, at 77-103 (describing evolution 
of BSD license).  
 79 See Tim Berners-Lee, The Semantic Web: A New Form of Web Content that is Meaningful to 
Computers will Unleash a Revolution of New Possibilities, SCI. AM., May 1, 2001, at 34, 36. 
 80 See David Becker, Taking XML’s Measure, at http://news.com.com/2008-1082-5080774.html 
(Sept. 23, 2003); Peter Lucas, Pumped Up: Business Reaches for the promise of XML, ELECT. COM. 
WORLD, Apr. 2001, at 25. 
 81 Adobe and Microsoft are reportedly including XML tools in the next version of their respective 
authoring products. See David Becker, Adobe Buys XML Software Maker, at http://msn-
cnet.com.com/2100-1012_3-5104919.html (last modified Nov. 10, 2003). 
 82 See www.legalxml.org. 
 83 In addition to complexity, the process raises important issues about control of the Web. See 
generally Edward L. Rubin, Computer Languages as Networks and Power Structures: Governing the 
Development of XML, 53 SMU L. REV. 1447 (2000). 
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For instance, using the example above, how do you define a contract 
clause that actually provides “no” warranties? Does that mean no express 
warranties in the contract and an attempt to disclaim implied warranties?84 
What if the disclaimer of implied warranties is ineffective because state law 
does not permit such disclaimers—in which case the license may say it is 
not providing any warranties but some may be implied in law—is that a “no 
warranty” situation?85 And what qualifies as a full warranty? Does this in-
clude a warranty that the software is free of defects?86 Does it include a 
warranty of clean title?87 How about a warranty of non-infringement for all 
types of intellectual property?88  
Moreover, although shopbot and XML technology may help users find 
desirable EULAs, that is only a small part of the story.89 The information 
that a shopbot encounters is useful only if the human principal knows what 
he or she is looking for and why it is important. XML-reading shopbots are 
only useful to a well-educated user. User education about EULAs necessar-
ily comes before the age of “EULAbots.” 
VIII. WHAT LAW SCHOOLS CAN DO TO IMPROVE THE FRIENDLINESS OF 
EULAS 
Law schools could play an important role in improving the friendli-
ness of EULAs by teaching law students how to draft user-friendly li-
censes. Law schools teach legal writing in a variety of ways. Some law 
schools simply rely on case reading to “teach” writing, supplemented by 
exam writing, research papers, and for a select few, law review work. Many 
law schools have specialized legal writing programs. These programs tend 
to focus on practice-oriented writings, primarily research memoranda and 
appellate briefs. It is probably fair to say that the most under-taught type of 
legal writing is contract drafting.90 Even if a law school does offer a course 
                                                                                                                          
 84 See U.C.I.T.A. § 406 (1999). 
 85 It is just as difficult to define when a license grant qualifies as a “copyleft” or “BSD-style” 
license. 
 86 See U.C.I.T.A. § 403 (1999). See also Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
in Software Contracts, supra note 58; Jeffery C. Selman & Christopher S. Chen, Steering the Titanic 
Clear of the Iceberg: Saving the Sale of Software from the Perils of Warranties, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 531 
(1997).  
 87 See U.C.I.T.A. § 401 (1999). 
 88 See Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 2, at 905-06. 
 89 An additional issue that may bear on adoption of Legal XML is its copyrightability. See Trotter 
Hardy, The Copyrightability of New Works of Authorship: “XML Schemas” as an Example, 38 HOUS. 
L. REV. 855 (2001); Phillips, supra note 76. 
 90 See Charles M. Fox, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN’T TEACH YOU 
(2002). 
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in contract drafting, however, it likely does not teach students how to draft 
licenses.91  
It would be unfair to criticize law schools too harshly for failing to 
teach license drafting. It has been only in the past decade that licensing has 
emerged as a discrete and important practice area. Today, licensing is a 
core part of both intellectual property and general commercial practice.  
There is a trend in law school education that could accelerate the addi-
tion of license drafting to the curriculum. Over the past few years many law 
schools have added intellectual property-related LL.M. programs, certifi-
cates, or concentration tracks.92 License drafting should be a core offering 
in these programs.  
Courses on license drafting can serve as a catalyst to get students 
thinking about and practicing the skill of creating user-friendly licenses. 
Licenses are a unique brand of contract: the contract law governing a li-
cense may come from U.C.C. Article 2, the common law of contracts, the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act,93 international treaties, 
foreign law, provisions within the intellectual property laws,94 or all of the 
above.95 There is an intimate relationship between contract law and intellec-
tual property law.96 Other laws put boundaries around licenses such as anti-
trust law and the E.C. Directive on reverse engineering.97  
The best licensing lawyers are the ones well-versed in these and other 
principles of licensing law. Deep knowledge of licensing law allows a law-
yer to make intelligent decisions about when a EULA can remain silent on 
                                                                                                                          
 91 The only student textbook on licensing law is a traditional casebook and does not focus on 
drafting. See KENNETH L. PORT, ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
(1999). 
 92 For many years, intellectual property-related LL.M. degrees have been offered at Franklin 
Pierce School of Law, John Marshall School of Law, and George Washington National Law Center. In 
the past few years, many other schools have followed suit, including Boston University School of Law, 
George Mason University School of Law, University of Houston Law Center, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology Chicago-Kent College of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Indianapolis), University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Stanford Law School (degree in Law, Science, and Technology), University 
of Texas School of Law (Austin), University of Washington School of Law, Washington University 
School of Law (St. Louis), Santa Clara University School of Law, University of San Diego School of 
Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, and Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law. In 
addition, many law schools offer intellectual property-related certificates and concentration tracks. 
 93 See http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm. 
 94 See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES, 
LIABILITIES (1994). 
 95 See Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 2, at 892 (discussing warranty of 
non-infringement). 
 96 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual 
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998). 
 97 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 
art. 6, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42. 
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a particular issue, saving precious words. It allows a lawyer to abandon 
safe, formulaic language, freeing the lawyer to draft in plain language. 
To improve licenses, lawyers need to learn two additional things. 
First, lawyers must learn how to write in plain language.98 Fortunately, 
many law schools teach this style of writing. Second, lawyers must learn 
the purpose of each component of a license, which will allow the lawyer to 
be more creative in his or her approach to drafting. 
IX.  WHAT THE LAW CAN DO TO IMPROVE THE FRIENDLINESS OF EULAS 
A. Legislating User-Friendliness 
EULAs are not the first legal document to be criticized for their lack 
of user-friendliness. In the 1970s, legislatures in the United States and 
abroad began passing legislation requiring99 sellers to use “plain language” 
in a variety of contracts and other legal documents. State legislatures first 
applied the so-called “plain language doctrine” to insurance contracts, but 
soon extended the reach of their legislation to other consumer contracts.100  
The federal government passed laws in the 1970s mandating the use of 
“plain English” in documents used in consumer transactions, such as writ-
ten warranties,101 bank account terms,102 and retirement plans.103 In 1978, 
President Carter signed an executive order declaring that all federal regula-
tions “shall be as simple and clear as possible.”104 In 1993 the Securities 
and Exchange Commission began an effort to apply the plain language doc-
                                                                                                                          
 98 BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A TEXT WITH EXERCISES (2001); 
MARK E. WOJCIK, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ENGLISH: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL TERMINOLOGY, 
REASONING, AND WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH (1998); RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR 
LAWYERS (4th ed. 1998). 
 99 The plain language disclosure movement began voluntarily in the private sector where lenders 
re-wrote their promissory notes into plain language. See Andrew T. Serafin, Comment, Kicking the 
Legalese Habit: The SEC’s “Plain English Disclosure” Proposal, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 681, 692 (1998). 
 100 See Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analy-
sis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (2002); David M. LaPrairie, Note, Taking the 
“Plain Language” Movement Too Far: The Michigan Legislature’s Unnecessary Application of the 
Plain Language Doctrine to Consumer Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1927 (2000). 
 101 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1994). 
 102 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(b) (2000). 
 103 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2000). 
 104 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (1978), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 
Fed. Reg. 13,193, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). President Regan revoked President Carter’s Executive 
Order shortly after taking office. Id. 
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trine to federal investor law, particularly proxy statements and prospec-
tuses105 used for selling securities.  
The plain language movement is not limited to the United States. 
European countries have been particularly active in passing plain language 
legislation to induce businesses to deploy readable contracts.106 Most nota-
ble is a European Union Council Directive requiring that certain terms of-
fered to consumers must be in “plain, intelligible language.”107 
B. Applying the “Plain Language” Mandate 
Legislatures use a variety of approaches to determine whether a party 
has met its “plain language” mandate. Some legislation simply states that 
parties must use everyday language, and leaves application of the standard 
for courts based on the facts and circumstances of the particular transaction. 
At most, the legislation provides some general guidelines for courts to con-
sider, such as the suggestion that they consider the nature of the parties 
involved in transaction. 
Other legislation focuses on the complexity and length of words and 
sentences used in a contract or other legal document. Some legislation uses 
the Flesch Test, which provides a statistical formula for measuring read-
ability.108 Still other legislation relies primary on a “facts and circum-
stances” test, but provides a safe harbor for contracts that meet an objective 
measure of readability or which have been pre-approved by a governmental 
agency such as the SEC or State Attorney General.109 
C. Should Legislatures Pass Laws Requiring Plain Language in EULAs? 
Some broadly sweeping state plain language laws may already apply 
to EULAs. Where they do not, however, and in jurisdictions that do not 
have plain language laws, should legislatures pass such laws to induce 
                                                                                                                          
 105 See Michael G. Byers, Eschew Obfuscation—the Merits of the SEC’s Plain English Doctrine, 
31 U. MEM. L. REV. 135 (2000); Serafin, supra note 99. 
 106 See Bates, supra note 100, at 43-90 (describing legislation in the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Sweden, and Israel). 
 107 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, art. 4, 
1993 O.J. (L 95) 29. “In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in 
writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about 
the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.” Id. at art. 5. 
 108 See Serafin, supra note 99, at 683-86. 
 109 See LaPrairie, supra note 100, at 1933. 
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software publishers to deploy user-friendly EULAs? The answer is a defi-
nite “maybe.” 
The goal of “plain language” legislation is noble.110 The difficult ques-
tion is how well such legislation works and whether it is worth the cost to 
businesses and taxpayers that it imposes. Below, I discuss these issues. 
1. Does Legislation Improve Readability?  
The most basic question to consider is whether legislation induces 
businesses to create more readable contracts. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the SEC plain language project has led to more readable documents. 
An Opinion released by the EU Economic and Social Committee on the 
effectiveness of the EU Directive seems to indicate that the results in the 
EU have been mixed.111  
Some approaches work better than others. Those jurisdictions that rely 
primarily on so-called objective tests of readability, such as the Flesch Test, 
fall prey to the many well-documented weaknesses of such tests. For exam-
ple, the Flesch Test is unable to recognize distinctions in grammar112 or 
word order.113 The Flesch Test limits its evaluation to the number of words, 
sentences, and syllables in the contract but cannot evaluate the overall ef-
fectiveness of communication. In other words, the Flesch test penalizes 
illustrations, elaborations, and clarifying words. This deficiency is referred 
to as the “clarity is verbal brevity” fallacy.114  
Other plain language measures simply leave matters to the judgment 
of the courts. This approach leaves contract drafters with considerable un-
certainty about whether they are in compliance, and consumers unsure 
about whether they will be successful in challenging contractual language.  
There are other approaches as well. The SEC publishes a practical 
guide entitled “A Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Dis-
closure Documents.”115 This guide, as the title suggests, describes the 
SEC’s view on what it takes to create acceptable documents. The Economic 
                                                                                                                          
 110 Some commentators argue that the law cannot be written plainly and simply, and that this 
notion needs to be eradicated. See ALFRED PHILLIPS, LAWYER’S LANGUAGE: HOW AND WHY LEGAL 
LANGUAGE IS DIFFERENT (2003). 
 111 See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Report from the Commission on 
the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer con-
tracts,” art. 7.1, 2001 O.J. (C 116) 117[hereinafter Committee Opinion]. 
 112 “I went to the store” versus “I goed to the store.” 
 113 “I went to the store” versus “Went I to the store.” 
 114 See Harold A. Lloyd, Plain Language Statutes: Plain Good Sense or Plain Nonsense?, 78 L. 
LIBR. J. 683, 690-91 (1986). See also discussion on Conflicting Objectives, supra Part V.E. 
 115 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (1997).  
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and Social Committee of the European Commission recommended the 
creation of “black list” contract terms (terms that are automatically void) 
and “grey list” contract terms (terms to receive special scrutiny by adminis-
trative authorities).116  
These guides to friendly contracts are often supplemented by some 
form of administrative interaction. In some cases, a business can submit a 
form contract or other document to an administrative agency for review. If 
the agency finds that the form is acceptable, the form is either deemed to be 
in compliance,117 receives a presumption of validity in case it is challenged, 
or some other positive treatment.118 
2. Does the Benefit Outweigh the Cost?  
Each approach to plain language legislation comes with costs as well 
as benefits. Below, I discuss some the trade-offs. 
a. The “just do it” approach 
The primary benefit of legislation that simply tells businesses to use 
plain language in standard forms is that it does not create much additional 
cost for administrative agencies. It puts the cost of enforcement on the 
courts and, primarily, on the litigating parties. This “benefit,” of course, 
creates a significant burden for the consumer, and some argue that this cost 
negates the benefit of the legislation.119 However, others point out that sim-
ply focusing the efforts of businesses on creating plain language contracts 
may be a significant positive benefit of plain language legislation in and of 
itself (i.e., that voluntary compliance alone results in material benefits).120 
b. The “objective measure” approach 
The primary benefit of legislation that relies on objective measures 
such as the Flesch Test is that it creates certainty about when a contract 
does or does not meet the legislative standard. Unfortunately, as discussed 
                                                                                                                          
 116 See Committee Opinion, supra note 111, at 10.6. 
 117 Id. at 8.2.2. 
 118 Prospectuses not in plain English will not receive accelerated review by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.461 (1997). 
 119 See Bates, supra note 100, at 6. 
 120 See Albert J. Millus, Plain Language Laws: Are They Working?, 16 UCC L.J. 147, 151-52 
(1983). 
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in Part IX.C.1, these objective tests do not necessarily lead to more read-
able documents and sometimes create incentives to say less when more 
would have been better.121 Some commentators have expressed concern 
that the burden of complying with the legislation will fall more heavily on 
small businesses, and this may be particularly true in the software industry 
where licensors come in all shapes and sizes and exist in large numbers.122 
c.  The “incentive” approach 
Some legislation attempts to motivate businesses to write user-friendly 
contracts by providing incentives to do so. Some laws create a presumption 
of validity for “plain language” terms or a safe harbor from claims of unfair 
business practices. In many ways this is a useful approach: businesses 
benefit from the certainty created by obtaining the blessing of an adminis-
trative agency; consumers benefit because contracts are reviewed with 
readability in mind.  
However, intensive involvement by administrative agencies in review-
ing draft EULAs would no doubt be very costly.123 It would also create a 
high logistical hurdle for software publishers who often release software 
spontaneously and in high volume. Even if the software publisher could get 
a draft EULA to the agency in a timely manner, there is the problem of 
timely turnaround (the fewer government employees involved, the slower 
the turnaround).124 It is fair to say that the higher the quality and speed of 
the agency review, the higher the bill for taxpayers. Is this price worth pay-
ing?125 The answer is a definite “maybe”—each legislature should make the 
determination after careful deliberation and research.126 
X.  WHAT CAN NGOS DO TO IMPROVE EULAS? 
Plain language legislation might have a positive impact on improving 
the friendliness of EULAs, but the greatest impact can be made by non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) dedicated to this mission.127 NGOs 
                                                                                                                          
 121 See Lloyd, supra note 114, at 690-94. 
 122 Id. at 693. 
 123 See E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 272-86 (1978). 
 124 See Bates, supra note 100 (proposing that all standard form consumer contracts by pre-
approved by the FTC).  
 125 See generally WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
 126 See Millus, supra note 120. 
 127 Cf. Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licensing, supra note 39, at 100-03 
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play an important role in the information economy and come in many 
shapes and descriptions.128 For example, technical standards organiza-
tions129 have designed many key technologies of the Internet130 and World 
Wide Web.131 Groups such as TRUSTe132 were formed to improve the prac-
tices for gathering and using private information on the Web. Even tradi-
tional consumer advocacy organizations such as Consumers Union133 have 
taken their work into cyberspace.  
The Web is a powerful setting for NGOs whose primary mission is 
education or advocacy.134 Not only does the Web make it easy for potential 
purchasers to find information, it makes it easy for educators and advocates 
                                                                                                                          
 
(proposing a standards organization to improve open source license form contracts); Merges, Contract-
ing into Liability Rules, supra note 66; Rosenfeld, supra note 72, at 53 (proposing a public interest 
metasite for providing pricing information).  
 128 "Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are private organizations (associations, federations, 
unions, institutes, groups) not established by a government or by intergovernmental agreement, which 
are capable of playing a role in international affairs by virtue of their activities, and whose members 
enjoy independent voting rights. The members of an NGO may be individuals (private citizens) or 
bodies corporate. Where the organization's membership or activity is limited to a specific State, one 
speaks of a national NGO and where they go beyond, of an international NGO. There is some contro-
versy as to whether an NGO has to be international, permanent and non-profit-making. Proper classifi-
cation of NGOs is also lacking. In terms of their activities, there are, generally speaking, two kinds of 
NGOs: those with non-profit, i.e. idealistic, objectives, and those with economic aims . . . ." Hermann 
H.-K. Rechenberg, Non-Governmental Organizations, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
612 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1997). See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and Inter-
national Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 185-86 (defining NGOs). Well known NGOs include 
Amnesty International and Medcins Sans Frontieres. See generally Stephan Hobb, Global Challenges to 
Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997) (discussing various activities undertaken by NGOs in the international arena).  
 129 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1907 (2002). 
 130 See Internet Engineering Task Force, Overview of the IETF, at 
http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/overview.html (last visited July 27, 2004). 
 131 See World Wide Web Consortium, About the World Wide Web Consortium, at 
http://www.w3c.org/consortium (last visited July 27, 2004). 
 132 See TRUSTe website, at http://www.truste.org (last visited July 27, 2004). 
 133 Consumers Union is the most prominent consumer advocacy organization. See id.; Sybil 
Shainwald, The Center for the Study of the Consumer Movement, 12 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 393, 393 
(1978). Other consumer-related NGOs include Center for Auto Safety, Consumer’s Choice Council, and 
Information Technology Industry Council. Commercial businesses also provide specialized consumer 
information, such as Carpoint and Edmunds Car Buying Guide for automobiles, and C/NET and ZDNet 
for computers and electronics. See also Loree Bykerk & Ardith Maney, U.S. CONSUMER INTEREST 
GROUPS (1995). 
 134 The World Wide Web is a particularly effective way to reach consumers. See Jim Guest, Con-
sumers and Consumerism in America Today, 36 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 139, 139-41 (2002) (reporting 
that in 2002 ConsumerReports.org had reached the mark of 830,000 subscribers). 
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to convey it.135 Using the Web, an NGO could be a powerful vehicle for 
making licensing more user-friendly. The EULA NGO could make licens-
ing more user-friendly in the following ways:  
 
* Make EULAs available for review pre-purchase; 
* Explain key license terms in plain language;  
* Provide detailed commentary on each license term for those who 
want additional information;  
* Serve as a forum to discuss EULAs;  
* Identify concerns and recommend improvements to EULAs; 
* Promote licensing best practices. 
 
The sections below elaborate on these points. 
A.  Pre-Transaction Disclosure of EULA Terms  
One criticism of so-called “shrink wrap licenses” is that consumers 
pay for the software before they can see the license (because the EULA is 
enclosed in the box, behind the plastic wrapper). Even though most soft-
ware publishers give a refund136 to customers who do not agree to the 
EULA, the process puts a burden on the consumer that would be best to 
eliminate and makes it challenging to “comparison shop” for better license 
terms. If a EULA NGO could become a central repository137 for EULAs for 
common software products, then those consumers who wish to review 
EULA terms prior to purchase could easily do so.138  
                                                                                                                          
 135  John King Gamble & Charlotte Ku, International Law—New Actors and New Technologies: 
Center Stage for NGOs?, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 221, 232 (2000) (“New technologies such as the 
Internet have created enormous opportunities for NGOs. Enterprising individuals with little institutional 
infrastructure beyond a computer can mobilze thousands of people over huge distances.”); Rona Nar-
done, Note, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World’s Water Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 183, 
193 (2003). 
 136 See Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (2002); U.C.I.T.A. § 211 
(1999). 
 137 Some EULAs may be copyrightable. However, there is a strong argument that hosting EULAs 
for educational purposes is a fair use under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 138 See id. 
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B. Education  
Most software users do not care to read EULAs,139 yet they do want to 
know what the EULA provides. In other words, users want to know what 
the EULA says without reading it.140 By providing an easy-to-read execu-
tive summary of each EULA, a EULA NGO could explain the gist of the 
EULA in an accessible manner.141 For those users who want to know more 
about a given term, the EULA NGO could provide a hypertext link to a 
detailed commentary and additional information that might assist the user’s 
understanding.  
Consumers142 highly value evaluations143 produced by independent 
third parties.144 The most useful information is provided by organizations 
that are rigorously objective145 in their evaluations.146 Evidence suggests 
that there are far too few organizations providing objective consumer prod-
uct information.147 
C. Forums, Feedback, and Best Practices  
The EULA NGO could provide constructive feedback to software 
publishers about how to improve their EULAs and licensing practices. The 
EULA NGO could host listservs and chat room discussions about EULAs. 
The information provided in these forums should provide useful informa-
tion to software publishers about how to improve their EULAs. The EULA 
NGO’s staff might also offer its licensing “best practices,” such as how to 
                                                                                                                          
 139 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2003). 
 140 See id. at 1214. 
 141 Software Publishers are reluctant to provide such summaries because they believe they will be 
accused of hiding any terms that they choose not to put in the summary. 
 142 See generally J.D. FORBES, THE CONSUMER INTEREST: DIMENSIONS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS, 89-96 (1987); ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE 
MARKETPLACE, 19-25 (1989); Michael Hornsby-Smith, The Structural Weaknesses of the Consumer 
Movement, 9 J. CONSUMER STUDIES AND HOME ECON. 291 (1985); Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and 
the Search for Empowerment, 19 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 397 (1991). 
 143 See James Mann & Peter Thornton, Consumerism in Perspective, 12 EURO. J. MARKETING 253, 
254-57 (1975). 
 144 See Eovaldi, supra note 42, at 1238. 
 145 To be useful to a court, the EULA NGO’s information must be unbiased and authoritative. See 
ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088-1091 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 146 See Howard Beales et al., Consumer Search and Public Policy, J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 11, 
19-22 (1981). 
 147 See Eovaldi, supra note 42, at 1239. 
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enter into enforceable EULAs and how to improve the friendliness of a 
particular EULA. This advice would be especially useful to small licensors. 
Over time, the EULA NGO will become a significant source of infor-
mation about particular EULAs. The public record created by the commen-
tary and user feedback, and the software publisher’s reaction to it creates a 
useful body of testimony about the EULA, especially the software pub-
lisher’s efforts to improve it (or not improve it, as the case may be) in the 
face of critical commentary and user feedback. The EULA NGO’s record 
could provide a history of good faith and good citizenship on the part of a 
software publisher or a history of ignoring constructive feedback.  
The EULA NGO will create and maintain a significant body of extrin-
sic evidence that could be useful in resolving disputes. The extrinsic mate-
rials may be admissible in an administrative action or litigation.148 Should 
litigation occur, the availability of the public record created and maintained 
by the EULA NGO should help expedite the discovery process and could 
help the court resolve the case.149  
The primary and desired effect of the public record, however, should 
be to encourage software publishers to improve EULA friendliness without 
litigation or administrative action.150 At present, software publishers get 
public feedback sporadically via flame mail151 and negative comments from 
the PC press or analysts.152 The EULA NGO can provide detailed, expert 
feedback on a regular basis, with consistent follow-up on new EULAs and 
“bug fixes” to older ones. 
                                                                                                                          
 148 The materials maintained by the EULA NGO may be introduced through expert testimony. The 
Federal Rules of Evidence permit expert testimony on matters involving scientific, technical, or special-
ized knowledge if the evidence would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determin-
ing a fact in issue. FED. R. EVID. 702. Generally, expert testimony is admissible to educate the court, 
and the trier of fact is given broad latitude to determine how much weight it should be accorded. Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
 149 See, e.g., ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In ACTV, the parties 
offered conflicting “Requests for Comments” from the World Wide Web Consortium to interpret a 
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CONCLUSION 
End user license agreements often contain valuable information, but 
hardly anyone reads them. Creating more readable EULAs improves the 
chances that people will read them and learn something when they do. 
Software publishers can create more readable EULAs if they make this a 
top priority, apply the right organizational process, and retain lawyers who 
are taught to draft readable licenses. Technology such as XML and shop-
bots can help users find useful information about licenses even if the EU-
LAs themselves are not particularly readable, but this technology is years 
away from widespread deployment.  
So how can users get the information from EULAs that they need 
without actually reading them? The answer is that someone needs to pro-
vide the information in a form that users can easily retrieve and understand. 
An organization dedicated to this mission could do it well, as a service to 
software users and as a catalyst to make licensing more user-friendly. 
